Interventionism in the Family: Does Adoption Law in England and Wales Advocate the ‘Theft’ of Children? by Richardson, Barbara Alice
Interventionism in the Family: Does Adoption Law in England and Wales 
Advocate the ‘Theft’ of Children? 
Barbara Alice Richardson* 
 
Abstract 
This article questions the use of interventionism by the State in child protection. The law 
of adoption is used to contrast the public’s apparent demand for the reduction of state 
control with children’s need and right of protection from neglect and maltreatment. 
Particular reference is made to the recent controversial rickets cases, as well as the 
Pacchieri case of 2013. This article points to academic, legal and public perspectives in 
order to include all  competing arguments involved. Finally, the article aims to 
demonstrate that it is sometimes necessary to undermine the sanctity of the private 
sphere in order to protect the society’s most vulnerable - children. 
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Introduction 
The law regarding child protection is unavoidably emotive. The divisive nature of 
this area of law is exacerbated by its apparent intrusion into the private sphere. This 
obvious conflict with the notion that the ‘home and family relations [are] private’1 
means that there is additional emphasis on regulation and due process in this area of 
law. In particular, the creation of an adoption order has the effect of ‘extinguish[ing] the 
parental responsibility2 of the child’s previous carers or biological parents in order to 
make the adopters the legal parents, a permanence that might serve to heighten the 
emotions of parties involved. In recent years, there has been much anti-interventionist 
criticism of adoption law in England and Wales by campaign groups such as ‘Justice for 
                                                          
*LL.B. Student, University of Kent graduate 2015 
1 Nikolas Rose, ‘Beyond the Public/Private Division: Law, Power and the Family’ (Journal of Law and Society 
14 1987) 61 
2 Adoption Act 1976, s.12(3)(a) (AA). 
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Families’3 and ‘Forced-Adoption’.4 These groups campaign against legal and social 
services and strongly criticise their practices. An example of the scandals incited by 
campaign groups is evident in the plethora of claims5 that followed LB Islington v Al Alas 
and Wray [2012],6 when a child was returned to their parents after it was uncovered that 
undiagnosed rickets, as opposed to physical abuse, had caused multiple fractures in 
his older sibling. More recently, Alessandra Pacchieri’s court-ordered cesarean-
section and the subsequent placement of her newborn for adoption, sparked public 
outrage with regards to the ‘theft’ of children by social services in the case of P (A 
Child) [2013].78 
This article critically analyses the concerns of those who campaign against 
adoption. Anti-adoption campaigners fear that the law allows children to be ‘snatched’ 
by social services when there is no risk to the child’s welfare.9 Campaign groups 
identify the permanence of adoption as its predominant problem and instead, 
promote alternative forms of care (i.e. Special Guardianship within the family or 
reunification). Furthermore, anti-adoption campaigners find issue with the social 
services’ role in applying adoption law. An article in the Daily Telegraph highlights 
these feelings by referring to social workers as the ‘state child snatchers’ who are 
‘authoritarian’ and ‘wicked’.10 A leader in anti-adoption campaigning, John Hemming 
MP, argues that there is a ‘prejudice problem’ in social worker reports that lead to 
‘procedurally unlawful’ adoption orders.11  Furthermore, Ian Josephs (a fellow 
                                                          
3  Justice for Families Campaign Group <http://www.justice-for-families.org.uk/> (Accessed 10th June 2015) 
4  Forced Adoption <http://forced-adoption.com/>  (Accessed 23rd February 2016) 
5 Diane Taylor, ‘Parents reunited with baby after court rules fractures were caused by rickets’ (The Guardian, 
9th May 2012) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/may/09/parents-baby-court-fractures-rickets> (Accessed 
23rd February 2016) 
6 [2012] EWHC 865 (Fam) 
7 [2013] EW Misc 20 
8 Cole Moreton, ‘Alessandra Pacchieri: Pitiful Tale of a Mother and her Lost Child’ (The Telegraph, 7th     
December   2013)   <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/10503079/Alessandra-
Pacchieri-Pitiful-tale-of-a-mother-and-her-lost-child.html > 
(accessed 4th April 2014) 
9 Ian Joseph, ‘Forced Adoption’ <http://www.forced-adoption.com/case-scenarios.asp> 
(Accessed 4th April 2014) 
10 Moreton (n8) 
11 John Hemming, ‘Experts must be Neutral (Lashin v Russia)’ (John Hemming’s Web Log, August 8th 2013) 
<http://johnhemming.blogspot.co.uk/search?q=lashin+v+russia> (accessed 14th March 2014) 
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campaigner) describes the phenomenon of “social workers tak(ing) babies at birth, not 
for anything (the parents) have done, but for something someone with a “crystal ball” 
thinks they might do in the future”.12 The media’s coverage of the adoption 
proceedings for Alessandra Pacchieri’s child clearly depicts how those opposing 
adoption use personal stories and sensationalism to provoke public anger at social 
workers and the law. For example, one outlet describes social services as “(taking) 
child from womb”.13 Thus summoning images of violence and drama. This article 
intends to illustrate that the claims made by anti-adoption campaigners and media 
outlets are exaggerated and driven by their politically driven opposition to state 
intervention. It does so by explaining the tensions between the traditional liberal ideal 
of an individual’s private life and the more contemporary model, which recognises the 
need for state intervention. Then, the article proceeds to consider more closely the 
part this tension plays in the application of adoption law: as the modern state 
demands both self-regulation and a high-level of intervention. It is understood that this 
is a controversial topic and one that should be approached tentatively. Nonetheless, it 
is argued that adoption law’s purpose is not to allow child ‘stealing’14   or intrusion by 
the state, but rather, to prioritise the protection of children’s welfare.15   
Interventionism has increased with our growing appreciation of children as valuable, 
vulnerable and in need of protection and will continue to do so as appreciation of the 
child’s place in society grows. 
 
 
 
Implications of Interventionism on Family Law 
The term ‘interventionism’ refers literally to the scope of the state’s intervention 
into our private lives. While state regulation and the regulation of the family in England 
                                                          
12 Joseph (n9) 
13 Colin Freeman, ‘Child taken from womb by caesarean and then put into care’ 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/10486452/Child-taken-from-womb-by-cae 
sarean-then-put-into-care.html (Accessed 27th October 2015) 
14 Joseph (n9) 
15 Adoption and Children Act 2002, s.1 (ACA) 
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and Wales is grounded in the liberal principles of ‘freedom’ and ‘privacy’, there must 
still be an element of state control and intervention for the protection of individuals. 
The question at hand in the adoption controversy, is the level to which that control 
should extend and at whom that control is targeted. Although undoubtedly affected by 
the countless interventionist ‘family reforms’ made in the 20th century, contemporary 
family law still advocates limited ‘coercive intervention’ into the family. Maintaining 
limited intervention has become complicated, however, due to the prioritisation of 
protecting child welfare. The Children Act 1989 was the first piece of legislation to 
recognise the need to protect and prioritise the welfare of children.16 Sociological 
studies prior to the creation of the Act found that ‘working with parents is not only 
more respectful, but more effective’ in protecting the welfare of children.17 It was on 
the basis of these findings that the Act was created and, consequently, many provisions 
in the Act guide local authorities to involve parents in child care proceedings (i.e. the 
‘partnership principle’).18  Although the Act appears to promote limited state regulation 
of families, the implementation of the ‘partnership principle’ in the Act is inherently 
paternalistic. The philosophy of paternalism refers to ‘the interference with a person’s 
liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to welfare’.19 In this sense it 
follows naturally that the Act may be paternalistic in nature as law in itself is 
paternalistic. The notion of state paternalism in regards to child protection assumes 
that ‘the state has a primary responsibility for children and ought to exercise full control 
except where delegation to the family is justified’.20  This assumption implies that 
familial privacy is a privilege earned by parents, rather than a right bestowed to them by 
a liberal government. Thus, although the law in theory promotes the personal freedom 
described by liberal theorists, in practice the State intervenes extensively in the family. 
A good example of the conflict between law and practice can be seen in the creation of 
care orders, where parental responsibility is preserved and, hence, the partnership 
                                                          
16 Children Act 1989, s.1 (CA) 
17 Ruth Sinclair and Roger Grimshaw, ‘Partnership with Parents in Planning the Care of their Children’ 
n(Children and Society Vol. 11 1997) 231 
18 i.e. CA s.17(1)(b): to promote the upbringing of such children with their families 
19 Martin Calder, ‘Child Protection: Balancing Paternalism and Partnership’ (British Journal of Social Work 25 
1995)749 (quoting Dworkin) 
20 Ibid 749 
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principle is applied. In this instance legislation appears to uphold the principle of 
personal autonomy by allowing parents to retain responsibility for their children, even 
in the most extreme of circumstances. In practice however, the ‘legislation is 
contradicted in the guidance and regulations issues alongside’21  the Act. This 
contradiction between legislation and guidance has ‘encouraged the ‘hovering, anxious’ 
type of social worker’22   and consequently, has resulted in children being monitored to 
the point of the social worker becoming an extra parent.23 Calder explains this 
phenomenon to be a result of our ‘current social and political context, where services 
and personal protection predominates’.24 This analysis implies that it is the public’s 
expectations of the state that have created the extensive 
paternalism we are now faced with. 
 
 
Our Private Life 
Questions regarding the limits of state intervention run to the very core of the 
controversy surrounding adoption. The debate surrounding interventionism is rooted 
in the belief of early liberal theorists that it is an inherent right of ‘man’ to be free of 
state rule in the private domain. It is this idea which informs anti-adoption 
campaigner complaints regarding state intervention. John Locke is considered by 
many to be the forefather of liberal government and his work, ‘The Second Treatise 
of Government’, is particularly relevant to the topic of the public versus private 
realms. Locke’s theory on liberal government revolves around the idea that we are 
born with the ‘natural’ and fundamental rights to live in a ‘perfect state of freedom’25 
and to be ‘equal amongst each other without subordination’.26 Locke’s description of 
these rights as ‘natural’ implies that disregarding them would be unnatural and 
                                                          
21 Calder (n19) 753 
22    IBid 
23 Social workers “too stressed” to do their job: Rachel Schraer, ‘Social workers too stressed to do their job 
according to survey’ (Community Care, January 7th 2015) 
<http://www.communitycare.co.uk/2015/01/07/stress-stopping-job-social-workers-say/> (Accessed 
23rd February 2016) 
24 Calder (n19) 763 
25 John Locke, ‘The Second Treatise of Government’   (1690) Chap. I s.1 
26  Ibid Chap. I s.4 
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consequently, wrong. Furthermore, ‘The Second Treatise of Government’ makes 
frequent reference to the concept of ‘private property’ and how this pertains to the 
private realm. Locke’s ideology regards the world, in its natural state, to be 
communal property belonging to everyone equally. Locke depicts obtaining property 
as a transformative process. Thus, where something is improved through the ‘labour 
of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, (the results) are properly 
his’.27The emphasis this formulation of property puts on transformation means that 
earthly resources must be made useful to be owned (i.e. clay mud is communal 
property, but a brick may be personal property). Through his exploration of 
‘freedom’ and the ‘private’, Locke ‘explicitly and systematically distinguishes political 
from familial (and generally personal) relationships’.28 Locke’s work therefore 
appears to advocate a strong non-interventionist stance, similar to that of anti-
adoption campaigners. However, Locke’s work also refers to the notion of state 
protection through the ’social contract’.29 The social contract infers that a man 
‘divests himself of his natural liberty’ when he agrees to ‘join and unite into a 
community’.30 This community then ensures our ‘comfortable, safe and peaceable 
living’.31 Thus Locke concludes that, although there is a natural right to freedom and 
privacy, these rights are not absolute and may be overruled by each man’s obligation 
to the democratic community that he joins.32 As an early liberal theorist, Locke 
constructs a strong division between public and private but also, argues for the loss 
of freedom in return for community protection. Locke’s description of the social 
contract represents the first formation of state power in the public sphere. Thus, 
Locke identifies the problem faced by the liberal state of wanting to protect 
community members and yet, wanting to protect their private lives; the battle which 
we now see between those advocating and against adoption. 
 
                                                          
27 Mary Walsh,‘Locke and Feminism on Private and Public Realms of Activities’ (The Review of Politics Vol. 57 
No. 2 1995) 261 
28 Locke (n25) Chap. VIII 
29 Ibid 
30  Ibid Chap. VIII s.95 
31 Ibid Chap. VIII s.95 
32 Ibid Chap. VIII s.97 
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Foucault 
A more contemporary liberal political theorist is Michael Foucault, famous for his 
creation of the notion of ‘governmentality’. This definition refers to the art, or ‘how’, 
of governance throughout all levels of society. The notion of governmentality is also 
used by Foucault to rationalise state power and explain ‘how’ this power functions. 
Foucault argues that the birth of the ‘state’ in the 16th Century created with it a new 
form of ‘political power’ that is both ‘individualising and totalising’.33 Thus, in the 
modern state, individuals are recognized and integrated so long as they adhere to a 
certain standard (i.e. the standard of the law abiding and contributing citizen). This 
element of power leads to the omnipotent nature of state regulation and 
intervention. Foucault further explains that ‘power exists only when it is put into 
action’.34Thus, the state retains its power by acting on the actions or, the possibility of 
action by the individual. In regards to adoption law, this theory of state power refers 
to the creation of an adoption order (state action) in response to, or to prevent, the 
abuse of a child (individual action). In light of this description of state power, it would 
appear that Foucault believes interventionism to be an inherent part of governance. 
According to Foucault, intervention takes two opposing shapes. The first is simple, 
‘direct intervention by means of empowered and specialised state apparatuses’.35The 
second is more interesting and relates to the aforementioned ‘totalizing and 
individualizing’ form of state power. Foucault argues that the state intervenes with 
and regulates individuals by attempting to make them responsible and accountable 
for their own actions. The state ‘aspires to construct prudent subjects’.36 Allowing 
individuals to regulate themselves within the private sphere is therefore merely a 
‘technique of power’37  that allows a ‘reduction in sorts of welfare-state 
                                                          
33 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ (Critical Inquiry Vol. 8 No. 4 1982) 782 
34 Ibid 788 
35 Thomas Lemke, ‘The Birth of Biopolitics: Michael Foucault’s Lecture at the Colege de France on Neo-Liberal 
Governmentality’ (Economy and Society Vol. 30 No. 2 2001) 201 
36 Ibid 201 
37 Lemke (n35) 203 
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intervention’,38 but also has the effect of increasing pervasive state regulation. 
However, self-regulation is only intended to work for the majority of the public and 
time (i.e. most people do not break the law and do contribute to society but there are 
others and times when people fail to self-regulate). When self-regulation fails, the 
state intervenes with its ‘specialized state apparatuses’ and thus retains its power. 
Foucault’s theory of governmentality in the neoliberal state illustrates a more 
pervasive form of governance than that described by Locke. Foucault argues that the 
contemporary liberal state has formed a disciplinary society in which ‘law’s place 
diminishes with the growth of more diverse forms of discipline’ (i.e medicine, human 
sciences).39 Thus, as these disciplines grow, a ‘different modality of power’ is born and 
new regulatory bodies emerge.40 In regard to family law, ‘the history of the child as a 
specific category of people with special needs […] is clearly part of the growth of the 
human sciences’, particularly of the ‘psy’ professions.41 Therefore, as knowledge of the 
child as an important member of the community has grown, regulation has ‘extended 
itself more and more to cover family matters’.42 Foucault connects the ‘special areas of 
concern to the emergent ‘psy’ professions’43 with the expansion of intervention. Thus, 
while Locke understood a basic form of regulation in terms of membership of the 
community, Foucault identifies the expansion of intervention due to the creation of 
more regulatory bodies. In family law, this would mean the social services. Foucault’s 
connection between discipline and governance helps explain the difference between 
the basic form of state protection seen in early liberal societies and, the highly-
regulated neoliberal society that we live in today. 
 
Feminist Theories 
The question of interventionism is also central to feminist debate as it is argued to 
be imperative to limiting hidden inequalities. While those against adoption call for 
                                                          
38 Ibid 202 
39 Carol Smart, ‘Feminism and the Power of Law’ (Routledge 1989) 14 
40 Ibid 15 
41  Ibid 
42 Ibid 17 
43 Smart (n39) 
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limited intervention, for women ‘the measure of intimacy [is] the measure of 
oppression’44 and thus, interventionist governance is fundamental in lifting this 
oppression. Katherine O’Donovan explains the potential oppressive nature of families 
as a ‘black box’.45 O’Donovan’s ‘black box’ illustrates the family as an entity into which 
‘the law does not purport to peer’.46   However, the ‘black box’ family is vulnerable as 
regulators fail to see the ‘power inequalities’ that exist within the box.47 Thus, family 
members with in the black box, and particularly children, are left vulnerable to 
oppression. The familial oppression identified by O’Donovan supports state 
intervention as it is required for the black box to be opened and, for hidden inequalities 
to be exposed. In addition to O’Donovan’s black box theory, Frances Olsen’s ‘first level 
of criticism’ similarly calls for more state interventionism.48  This ‘first level’, referred to 
by Olsen, is grounded in the simple objection to ‘the withdrawal of law from the so-
called domestic sphere’ and the effect this withdrawal has on the oppression of women 
and children.49 However, Olsen’s ‘second level of criticism’ becomes more complicated 
and argues that the public and private realms are ‘shown not to be analytic categories 
at all’.50 According to Olsen’s second level, it is therefore difficult, or even impossible, 
to ascertain whether an action is private or by the state. There is a general consensus 
that ‘what we want to do’51 is private action and this form of action can encompass a 
number of different activities (i.e. domestic violence, watching graphic porn). The 
problem that arises from the private vs. public distinction is that we can only 
understand something as ‘unjust’ (and thus subject to state action) where society, and 
the law, does not support the private action. A good example of this can be seen in 
1950s America, where blatant discrimination against African-Americans was acceptable 
and legal. Until norms around discriminatory behaviour changed, committing the 
private action of discrimination could not be wrong or worthy of state action. This 
                                                          
44 Ruth Gavison, ‘Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction’ (Stanford Law Review Vol. 46 No.1 1992) 1 
45 Katherine O’Donovan, ‘Family Law Matters’ (Pluto Press 1993) 
46 Hilarie Barnett, ‘Sourcebook on Feminist Jurisprudence’   (Routledge 2012) 152 
47 Ibid 153 
48 France Olsen, ‘Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques on the Public/Private Distinction’ 
(Constitutional Commentary 10 1993) 323 
49 Ibid 323 
50 Ibid 324 
51 Ibid 324 
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particular line of reasoning does not critique interventionism in itself, but rather what 
actions we put in either the public or private categories. As Foucault explains, the 
growth of knowledge has changed attitudes towards children by allowing us to further 
understand their importance to society and the need for their protection. 
Consequently, the abuse of children (like racism against African-Americans) has 
become a matter worthy of state protection as is reflected in the reforms made in the 
early 21st Century. 
 
Adoption Law 
 
Principles behind the Adoption and Children Act 2002 
The aforementioned interventionism employed by the state is governed by statute 
and case law. Most predominantly in adoption law, the Adoption and Children Act 2002 
effected a long-awaited reform of adoption law and created a more child-centric, 
interventionist adoption law. The Act reflected changing attitudes concerning adoption 
and acted to formally codify these attitudes. Early adoption legislation, such as The 
Adoption of Children Act 1926, had a predominant and simple aim of replacing ‘the 
widespread practice of unregulated de facto adoption with a legal route’.52   There was 
also a public consensus at this time that adoption was a form of service to benefit 
infertile couples and single mothers. A mother’s humiliation of having a child out of 
wedlock could be alleviated by at the same time blessing a couple with a baby. The 
adopted child in this transaction became a commodity, and their welfare was given little 
consideration. Throughout the 20th Century, in fact, the issue of ‘safeguarding the 
welfare of babies… was not (at all) addressed’.53   The Adoption and Children Act 2002 
overturned this failing and changed the function of adoption to be a service for 
children.54   The Act implements the ‘welfare principle’,55 making the adopted child’s 
                                                          
52 Caroline Ball, ‘The Adoption and Children Act 2002: A Critical Examination’ (Adoption and Fostering Vol.29 
No.2 (2005) 6 
53 Ball (n52) 7 
54 DoH ‘Making a Difference’ 1999a 
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welfare of paramount importance and consideration.56 The Act was also created with 
the purpose of increasing the number of adoptions and encouraging local authorities to 
use adoption. It is therefore understandable that some parents and campaigners have 
become anxious about the perceived overuse of adoption and the arbitrary placement 
of children. Furthermore the Act’s paramountcy principle, which requires that the 
“paramount consideration [...] must be the child’s welfare, throughout his 
life”,57transforms adoption law from a service for birth parents into a threat to their 
family lives. More recently, the Children and Families Act 2014 has placed further 
emphasis on speeding up the adoptive process through enforcing time limits on care 
proceedings58 and thus, further limiting the protection of birth parents. Consequently, 
the law has become the subject of criticism. On the other hand, however, it is important 
to note that the paramountcy principle can also benefit birth parents. The welfare 
principle incorporates the ‘natural parent presumption’,59 the assumption that a child’s 
welfare is best protected by being raised by his natural parents, and thus offers further 
support to the maintenance of biological families. The principle also recognizes the 
benefit of contact between children and their birth parents, evident in the replacement 
of the old ‘transplant’ model with new forms of more open adoption. 
Thus, the paramountcy principle does not aim to separate biological families but rather, 
subordinates parental rights to allow for the prioritisation of child welfare. This 
principle is reflected in the new emphasis on social services ‘working with’ families and 
using the pre-proceedings process to avoid entering care proceedings and ultimately 
reducing parental input.60 
 
Placement for Adoption 
When working with parents fails, social services will turn to adoption to protect the 
child. The first step in the adoptive process is the placement of the child with 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
55 General principle found in the Children Act (1989) 
56 ACA s.1(2) 
57 Ibid 
58 Children and Families Act (2014), s.14 
59  Re D (Care: Natural Parent Presumption) [1999] CFLQ 423 
60 Public Law Outline 2014 
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prospective adopters. The child may be immediately placed for adoption when all 
parties with parental responsibility (including the birth parents) have consented to the 
placement,61In circumstances where the parties refuse to consent, the local authority 
must apply for a placement order from the Court.62 The creation of a placement order is 
regarded as a gravely serious measure and must be considered to be the most 
beneficial option for the child.63 The placement order also represents a major element 
of the construction of adoption as ‘theft’ by anti-adoption campaigners.64 However, 
placement orders are usually made where the birth parents’ parental responsibility has 
already been restricted through the creation of a care order65 and when the ‘significant 
harm’ test has been satisfied.66 The placement order is also subject to consideration of 
the welfare principle and checklist.67  In cases of extreme abuse and harm, the 
application of the welfare principle may lead to the creation of a placement order even 
where finding prospective adopters is a seemingly impossible task.68  Contrastingly, the 
principle may also act to prevent a placement from taking place. In Re S-H (A Child) NS-H 
v Kingston upon Hull City Council and MC [2008,69for example, it was held that 
placement is only appropriate when the child is both ‘ready’ and in a ‘condition’ to be 
adopted. Although a child’s placement is relatively early in the adoption process, the 
creation of a placement order has massive implications for the child’s birth parents. 
Most predominantly because any contact order in place is extinguished, thus leaving 
parents vulnerable to receiving more limited contact with their child as contact 
arrangements are reconsidered.70 Furthermore, when the child has been placed with 
prospective adopters, only the local authority has the right to remove them from their 
care.71The two aforementioned provisions have the effect of giving birth parents limited 
(or no) access to their child in order to ascertain their child’s feelings on the placements. 
                                                          
61 ACA s19(1) 
62 Ibid s.21(1) 
63 Ibid s.1(6) 
64 Joseph  (n9)  
65 CA , s.31(1)  66  
66  Ibid s.31(2)(a)  
67 ACA s.1(4) 
68 Re T (Children: Placement Order) [2008] EWCA Civ 542 
69 [2008] EWCA Civ 493 
70 ACA s.27(4) 
71 Ibid s.34(1) 
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The placement order also signifies a block on parental objections to the final adoption 
order, except in ‘exceptional circumstances’.72 With these provisions in mind, it seems 
obvious why placement is the focus of anti-adoption concerns. The placement of a child 
can appear to be a ‘theft’ as parents often do not consent and have no power to stop 
the placement: the parents effectively lose their control. The creation of placement 
orders clearly represents the subordination of parental rights to allow for the protection 
of the child’s welfare. However, where the ‘significant harm’ test is satisfied, this high 
level of intervention is necessary to protect vulnerable children. 
 
Adoption Orders 
The creation of an adoption order is dependant on either continued parental 
consent or dispensed consent and the Court’s consideration of the Act’s welfare 
checklist.73  The welfare checklist directs the Court to consider certain elements of the 
child’s life. The elements codified by the checklist include; the child’s wishes and 
feelings, the child’s needs, the likely effect adoption will have on the child, the child’s 
relevant characteristics, any harm suffered by the child and the child’s relationships 
with their wider family.74 Unlike the welfare checklist found in the Children Act 1989, 
the adoptive welfare checklist demands that the Court contemplates the child’s 
welfare for the remainder of their life.75 The Court particularly focuses on examining 
the child’s relationships with their wider family.76 In Re C [2009], for instance, the 
Court turned to the children’s relatives and held that the children should be placed 
with their grandmother as they had already formed a close bond with her.77 In a 
similar vein, the Court is also obliged to consider alternative orders to adoption,78 as 
well as, the child’s ascertainable feelings.79 The consideration of familial and 
alternative orders falls under the policy that adoption should only be used as a last 
                                                          
72  Ibid s.47 
73  Ibid s.1(4) 
74 Ibid 
75 Re P (Children) [2008] 2 FCR 185 
76 ACA s.1(4)(f) 
77  [2009] 1 FLR 1425 
78 ACA s.1(6) 
79 Ibid s.1(4)(a) 
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resort. The application of the welfare checklist is, one could argue, the most positive 
element of the adoption process. In regards to birth parents’ interests particularly, its 
provisions clearly advocate the protection of the wider, if not nuclear, family. That 
being said, non-consensual adoption orders remain problematic for birth parents 
because of their legal effect. The creation of an adoption order is intended to create a 
new family, both legally and socially. In order to fulfill this purpose, adoptive parents 
are given full parental responsibility and the parental responsibility of the birth 
parents (and all others)   is extinguished.80 Furthermore, adoption orders are, for the 
most part, irrevocable. It is these provisions that cause anti-adoption campaigners 
particular concern, and understandably so as parents lose the right to parent their 
child indefinitely. The permanence of adoption appears to leave no room for mistakes 
by the Family Justice System. The provisions concerning dispensing with parental 
consent are clearly detrimental to the rights of birth parents: how consent is 
dispensed with and the implications of the dispensation are considered in the next 
section. 
 
 
 
Dispensing with Consent 
The concerns raised by anti-adoption campaigners are exacerbated by the 
dispensation of parents’ consent to adoption. Consent is most simply dispensed with 
when the parents cannot be found or, are incapable of giving consent.81   The 
‘incapability’ this provision refers to is grounded in the Mental Capacity Act’s 2005 
definition of ‘competence’ and is subject to a high-threshold test due to the implications 
it has on the parent’s rights. The dispensing of consent through absence or mental 
incapacity is rarely invoked and, more commonly, consent may be dispensed with 
merely on the basis that the ‘child’s welfare requires’ it.82  This provision makes parental 
objections irrelevant and is therefore subject to heavy, widespread criticism. For 
                                                          
80 Ibid s.46(1) 
81 ACA s.52(1)(a) 
82 Ibid s.52(1)(b) 
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example, the UK Independence Party note that ‘basic parental rights’ are infringed 
where ‘a child is placed with adopters, even though their parents did not consent’.83 
Additionally, the similarly right-wing ‘Forced Adoption’ group argues that dispensing of 
consent is an ‘infringement of human rights’ and ‘unjustifiable’.84 At first glance, the 
criticisms of this provision make sense as it appears to provide the Courts with a wide 
discretion to arbitrarily remove the parents’ consenting rights. There are, however, a 
number of ways in which the parents’ wishes may be considered. The word ‘requires’ in 
the provision, for instance, implies that consent must be dispensed with to ensure the 
child’s welfare. In Re P (Placement Order: Parental Consent) [2008]85 the definition of 
the word ‘requires’ was clarified by the Court of Appeal which held that the provision 
could only be satisfied where placement is imperative. Furthermore, parents are 
protected from the over-application of this provision through the Human Rights Act 
1998. In P, C and S v UK [2002],86   the European Court of Human Rights described 
adoption as a ‘grave interference’ with the right to family life that must only be used as 
a proportional response to the risk posed to the child under Article 8(2).87 The Article 8 
right to family life in relation to adoption however, is not absolute. This is because, 
where the adopted child has lived with their adopters for a long period of time, a new 
‘family life’ may have been created with the adoptive parents. Moreover, the creation 
of an adoption order is reliant on the ‘significant harm’ test having been satisfied.88 
Thus, the provision is subject to a high-threshold test prior to its application.89   In the 
Supreme Court judgment of the case Re B [2013],90 this test was set out to mean that to 
pass threshold, a judge must be satisfied that “the child is suffering or likely to suffer 
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significant harm” and that “the harm is attributable to the care given to the child if a 
care order is not made”.91 Thus, causation of the harm suffered by the child must be 
proven before a care order can be made. Finally, in the case of Re B-S [2013].92 
McFarlane LJ further stressed that the dispensation of consent should be a thing of last 
resort and only used in exceptional circumstances. This case has significantly reduced 
the use of adoption by the courts and has instead, encouraged the use of alternative 
solutions, such as placing the child within the family under a Special Guardianship 
Order. Nevertheless, critics of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 maintain that the 
new law does not allow for reasonable objections by parents to be made. Instead, the 
‘court will now be able to impose its view on them’ and thus, parents are caught in a 
position where any mistake made could lead to their children being removed.93 While it 
is understandable that parents and campaigners may be concerned about the 
dispensing of consent, it is necessary for the children caught in these circumstances. In 
the majority of cases placement cannot be hindered by a lack of parental consent 
because the child’s welfare is at such risk. It is therefore a sad necessity that the 
parents’ rights in these cases should be subordinated to that of their child. 
 
 
The Revocation of an Adoption 
The Adoption and Children Act 2002 was written with the intention of making 
adoptions secure and long-term. This means that they may only be revoked through 
the creation of another adoption order or, by the adopted child reaching maturity. In 
the case of Re B (Adoption Order: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995],94 Thorpe LJ explains 
that ‘the adopted child ceases to be the child of his previous parents and becomes the 
child for all purposes of the adopters’.95 If we are to accept that adoptive parents 
should be considered the legitimate parents of their adopted child, then it logically 
follows that their parenthood should only be revoked through a new adoption or the 
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child’s adulthood, as is the case for biological parents. Adoption orders may, however, 
be appealed in exceptional circumstances, where it is found that there was a 
fundamental flaw in its creation. In Re K (Adoption and Wardship) [1997],96 for 
example, a child was found under a pile of bodies in Bosnia and consequently fostered 
by an English family. When the family later attempted to adopt the child, knowing that 
the child had relatives wanting her back, the Judge dispensed with the objecting 
guardian’s consent in an attempt to let the adoption go ahead. In her judgment of this 
case, Butler-Sloss LJ revoked the adoption on the grounds that ‘a defect in natural 
justice’ had occurred. This case depicts the very ‘exceptional circumstances’ under 
which an adoption may be revoked. However, in another ‘exceptional’ case, Webster v 
Norfolk County Council [2009],97 the Court of Appeal accepted that the biological 
parents had suffered a miscarriage of justice, but still refused to revoke an adoption on 
grounds of public policy. Webster’s case was one of undiagnosed scurvy causing their 
child to appear physically abused, although he was not. Unlike the case of Re B, 
however, there was not held to be a fundamental flaw in the creation of the adoption 
order as the judge had correctly created the order on the evidence he had at the time. 
These two cases make evident how rarely adoptions may be revoked. Alternatively, 
birth parents may apply for a residence order for their adopted child. A residence 
order will not revoke the adoption, but it will restore the birth parents’ parental 
responsibility and allow the child to live with them. A residence order in these 
circumstances is unlikely to succeed, unless the birth parents can prove that the 
adoption has  completely broken down.98 The law faces the problem of promoting both 
justice and secure families. It is for this reason that parents are unlikely to successfully 
revoke an adoption order. 
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Problems with Adoption 
 
Alessandra Pacchieri’s ‘Forced’ Adoption 
As previously explained, adoption law is problematic because of its interventionist 
nature and how it requires the dispensal of parental consent. This in turn leads to high 
levels of public involvement in cases which are picked up by media outlets. The case of 
Re P (A Child) [2013],99 for example, concerns Alessandra Pacchieri’s newborn, baby P, 
and a local authority’s application for an adoption order in regards to baby P. This trial 
was presided over by Newton J who reasoned that, in this case, the creation of an 
adoption order would be an appropriate measure. Newton J grounded his decision in 
the adoption checklist as found in the Adoption and Children Act 2002, s.1(4). He began 
his judgment by explaining Pacchieri’s history as a mother. It was no secret to the 
relevant parties that Pacchieri had long ‘had problems with her mental health’100 and 
her ‘two previous children […] are currently cared for by their 
grandmother’.101Furthermore, Pacchieri had suffered a ‘long period of restricted 
contact [with the children] [...] both (in accordance with) the Grandmother’s wishes and 
the Courts’.102 Pacchieri’s mental health problems meant that she needed extra help in 
her role as a mother. Under the welfare checklist it would of course have been 
preferable if baby P could be placed with a family member.103 However, baby P’s 
grandmother was already overstretched and felt she could not handle a child. 
Additionally, baby P’s father had been given ‘permission to intervene’104 in the 
proceedings and had failed to show an interest. Based on the examination of baby P’s 
family background, Newton J held that care within the family was not plausible105 and 
that therefore, care outside the family must be considered. As an alternative to the 
adoption order, Pacchieri proposed that ‘P would remain in foster care for 
approximately a year’ to allow herself to show that she ‘would be able to maintain her 
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medication and maintain a stable life’.106  However, there was some concern regarding 
this proposal’s ‘timeframe and also about the durability of the mother’s commitment to 
taking her medication’.107 It was the Court’s obligation to prioritise the child’s welfare 
and the instability that would arise from intermittently placing P in foster care would 
not best do so. Moreover, Pacchieri’s struggle with her medication implied that foster 
care would be necessary for longer than a year, leaving baby P in a state of limbo. The 
Court, in  this  case, willingly accepted that adoption ‘represents a massive curtailment 
of both parents and of P’s rights under Article 8’108 and that, unfortunately, sometimes 
this curtailment is necessary to protect a child’s welfare. Furthermore, Newton J 
repeatedly recognised Pacchieri’s ‘desire and wish to care for her children’109 and 
apologised to her for ‘the way in which the case has unfurled’.110 From a distance this 
judgment appears to be an example of gross intervention by the Family Justice System 
into a competent woman’s family life. However, upon closer inspection it is evident that 
this adoption order was necessary for the sake of P’s welfare. Pacchieri had long been 
considered unable to take care of her children both by the Italian Courts and by her own 
family who were not able to take on another of her children.111 
Alessandra Pacchieri’s adoption case made headline news due to its extreme and 
unusual circumstances. The Daily Mail and The Telegraph were particularly vitriolic in 
their coverage of the proceedings and used the seemingly dramatic circumstances of 
the case to capture public attention. The Daily Mail, for instance, described Pacchieri as 
‘the mother whose baby was snatched by social workers’.112  Public perceptions of social 
work and child protection rely on media portrayals and hence, headlines like this 
connect images of social workers to images of ‘thieves’. Dr. Philip Mendes explains that, 
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in the matter of child protection and adoption law, ‘media coverage (particularly in the 
tabloid media) has been sensationalist and simplistic and characterised by […] a search 
for scapegoats’.113 In regards to the coverage of Pacchieri’s case, social workers and 
adoption law have become these ‘scapegoats’ and, consequently, have been vilified by 
‘simplistic’ descriptions of an ‘intelligent and articulate’114 woman receiving 
exaggeratedly poor treatment. Furthermore, Mendes argues that the media and public 
are ‘reluctant to believe that children can be harmed by a parent’.115 This belief is 
evident in the media portrayals of Pacchieri’s case that depict her mourning her ‘little 
princess’116 and thus, frame Pacchieri as a wronged parent. Poor media portrayals of 
adoption appear to be deeply entrenched in modern culture. In Australia, for example, 
media coverage of a child protection case almost identical to Pacchieri’s also portrayed 
social workers as ‘snatching […] a baby from the operating table’.117 The similarities 
evident in the global media coverage of child protection cases appear to show a 
common political agenda by media outlets of criticising state intervention into the 
family. Adoption law is particularly vulnerable to being labelled as ‘authoritarian and 
intervention[ist]’118by those wanting to limit state control. Media outlets play on this 
vulnerability to promote their agenda against state intervention. The 
portrayal of adoption law as ‘evil’ is not, however, beneficial to its betterment or to the 
protection of vulnerable children. In Pacchieri’s case, for example, the media 
misrepresented the facts at hand and consequently constructed a misapplication of the 
law that may not have actually occurred. For example, The Telegraph wrote that baby P 
‘must be sent to live with complete strangers’.119  A claim like this leads readers to 
believe that the law does not allow for an adjustment period between baby and 
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prospective adopters, which is untrue.120 The Pacchieri coverage, in particular, is littered 
with media representations that do not match the facts of the case. Moreover, the 
coverage of the case inspired several articles to be written about other women who 
suffered ‘heartbreak at having (their child) snatched away with no warning”.121 
Consequently, following a high profile case such as Pacchieri’s, there is a ripple effect 
and the public’s knowledge of the law is distorted. The media fails to serve both 
lawmakers and the public alike through the sensationalisation of adoption proceedings 
by misinforming the public of their rights and the likely consequences of their actions. 
Anti-adoption campaigners believe too that ‘nuances may be lost’122   in reporting and 
thus, their beliefs are not properly promoted. 
 
 
Anti-Adoption Campaigns 
The Anti-Adoption campaigners who write about cases such as Pacchieri’s appear 
to oppose adoption because of a consensus that the Family Justice System has an 
‘obsession with adoption’.123 More specifically, campaigners use the term “forced 
adoption” to describe non-consensual adoption to their audience. This ‘obsession’, to 
campaigners, results in alternatives to adoption being underused and to adoption being 
misused. The long-term care alternative predominantly referred to by campaigners is 
that of ‘long-term fostering’ which they believe to have ‘very similar outcomes’ to 
adoption.124   It is true that long-term fostering is an option that offers the child some 
sense of security while giving parents the chance to appeal the placement. However, the 
Adoption and Children Act 2002 sets out the child’s welfare as the Court’s ‘paramount 
consideration’125  and thus, the care plan that is most beneficial to the child’s welfare 
must be chosen. Many studies comparing the short and long-term effects of fostering 
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and adoption have found that ‘the binding nature of adoption is of deep psychological 
significance to the long-term foster child’.126   In fact, in a contemporary study 
undertaken by Bohman and Sigvardson it was found that ‘at 18 ‘maladjustment’ in the 
fostering group was 2-3 times more frequent than among controls and in the adoption 
group’.127The maladjustment suffered by long-term foster children is believed to be due 
to them ‘feeling unusually insecure and lacking a full sense of belonging’.128 Furthermore, 
both foster carers and children alike report feeling a ‘continual state of anxiety’129 as a 
result of the lack of permanency in their relationship. These reports on the adverse 
effects of long-term fostering reach the conclusion that ‘the ideal for children in long-
term fostering is to be adopted by their foster carers’.130 As adoption appears to be 
hugely beneficial to children, then it must be the most preferable option for children 
entering care. Anti-adoption campaigners do not fault the law for prioritising the child’s 
welfare and, in fact, agree that we should explore ‘how best to protect children’s welfare 
and ensure that this is done’.131 The question that appears to have been identified by 
campaigners is, therefore, whether adoption is used too readily by social services in 
situations where the child’s welfare is not at risk. The anti-adoptionist distrust of the 
social services is understandable due to the interventionist nature of the social services’ 
role. For example, Fathers for Justice describes the ‘cruel and degrading treatment of 
families’ by the government and social services,132 while another group’s entire focus is 
to be a ‘reform movement against government power’.133   John Hemming MP, a leader 
in forced adoption campaigning, rationalises the hatred of the social services by 
campaign groups by explaining that the requirement of ‘independence of evidence 
                                                          
126 John Triseliotis, ‘Identity and Security in Adoption and Long-Term Fostering’ (Adoption and Fostering Vol. 
7 No. 1 1983) 22  
127 Ibid 27 
128 Ibid 28 
129 Ibid 28 
130  Ibid 30 
131 Hemming(n11) 
132  Fathers For Justice <http://www.fathers-4-justice.org/our-campaign/our-mission/> (Accessed 28th 
October 2015) 
133 Social Services Activist Group 
<https://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/regions/manchester/2010/11/467791.html> (Accessed 28th 
October 2015) 
 KENT STUDENT LAW REVIEW     Volume 2 2015 
 
actually mean[s] that most of the decisions in the UK are procedurally unlawful’.134 The 
‘independence of evidence’ Hemming refers to here concerns the reliance within the 
Family Justice System on ‘assessments by employees of the local authority’ (i.e. social 
workers).135 Campaign groups fear that those making assessments in Family 
Proceedings lack neutrality and hold a prejudice against biological parents.136 Of course, 
if the social workers making assessments and thus guiding judgments do hold a prejudice 
against biological parents, then the campaigners’ belief that adoption orders are made 
unnecessarily and unfairly would be entirely founded. However, the case law only cites a 
few instances in which the ‘Court has had to address the question of misconduct by a 
local authority’.137   A recent case, Re Z (A Child: Independent Social Work Assessment) 
[2014]138illustrates the Court’s approach to unfair social work assessments. In this case, 
Bellamy J upheld the Father’s application to obtain an independent social worker 
assessment due to concerns regarding the ‘quality of the social work assessment and… 
whether [the father] has been treated fairly’.139 In his judgment, Bellamy J turned to the 
Family Procedure Rules 2010, which restricts evidence to ‘that which in the opinion of 
the Court is necessary to assist the Court to resolve the proceedings’.140 Here, the word 
‘necessary’ lies somewhere between ‘indispensable on the one hand and useful, 
reasonable or desirable on the other’.141 Thus, it is evident that in the majority of cases 
expert evidence will form a significant part of the proceedings. However, Bellamy J was 
also eager to note that the Court holds an overriding concern that a placement order 
should be a last resort. Citing Hale J in Re O (Care or Supervision Order) [1996],142 Bellamy 
J elaborated that minimal intervention best protects the child’s welfare. Therefore, 
although the Courts will be guided by social work assessments, there is an overwhelming 
concern that intervention should be minimised where possible. Moreover, Bellamy J 
accepted that social worker assessments ‘must be, and must be seen to be, fair, robust 
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and thorough’ due to their impact on outcomes.143 Additionally, in Jones v Kaney [2011], 
the Supreme Court ruled that those giving assessments in Court would no longer be 
immune from professional negligence suits.144 This judgment, alongside the recently 
introduced ‘necessity’ requirement,145 illustrate that the Court accepts the likelihood of 
personal prejudice affecting social work assessments. It is inevitable that occasionally 
social workers may lack neutrality but, the Courts are prepared to overrule a social 
worker assessment when it is unfair. 
As previously considered in the context of interventionist theory, it is relevant at 
this point to consider Calder’s identification of the ‘balance’ between the public and 
private domains in child protection. Despite the clear opposition, which is held by 
campaigners and right-wing media outlets, Calder’s work has the effect of making the 
reader question whether society actually wants less interventionism. Sociologists who 
have researched the practice of child protection for the most part agree that it is an 
area of law that ‘favour[s] extensive state intervention’.146   With the theories previously 
discussed in mind, it would appear therefore that the public tends to agree that state 
intervention is necessary in regards to the protection of families. In terms of family life, 
the public vs. private debate is particularly difficult because of its personal and intimate 
nature. When discussing certain aspects of the family (i.e. same-sex parents and single 
mothers) for instance, it seems obvious that the Lockean stance of autonomy over 
ourselves and our property is most appropriate to apply to the family. On the other 
hand, when it comes to the issue of child protection, it seems more appropriate to 
support the feminist perspective that a narrower private realm is more effective in 
protecting the vulnerable. Hence, the family is really at the centre of the public vs. 
private debate as it is an institution that requires several competing policies in order to 
best regulate it. It is because of the nature of the family that the legal and social 
services often find themselves in a ‘no win’ situation. It is argued here that this ‘no win’ 
phenomena is at the heart of the question as to whether the law is advocating child 
‘theft’ and, that this phenomenon supports the statement presented in this article, 
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which proposes that the law in theory and practice has good intentions regarding child 
protection. While the social services continue to intervention into family lives, they are 
certain to face opposition. However, if the social services were to stop intervening, they 
would face uproar regarding the failure to protect children. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Adoption law is inherently interventionist because of its role within the private, familial 
sphere. The application of adoption law fits perfectly within the Foucaultian theory of 
neoliberal governmentality. Governance encourages self-regulation through the 
formation of ‘good’ families but, is willing to intervene where self-regulation fails. In 
regards to family life, intervention is justifiable because of the perceptions of children as 
vulnerable and the common wish to protect them. This stance on interventionism is 
evident in some feminist perspectives that ‘favour extensive state intervention’147 and 
regard it as a necessary evil to protect women  and child. Furthermore, the approach to 
adoption in England and Wales is upheld by the European Court of Human Rights, which 
regards adoption orders as a proportionate breach of Article 8 rights. However, the 
interventionist nature of adoption law also makes it vulnerable to extensive criticism by 
the public and media. As Mendes outlined in his article, the media relies on the role of 
social workers as ‘intruders’ to create hype and attract readers. The disdain created by 
media portrayals of adoption is especially evident in the Pacchieri case. This case’s 
extreme circumstances provided media outlets and anti-adoption campaigners alike with 
an opportunity to depict those in the Family Justice System as ‘evil’. However, although 
the anxieties voiced by those opposing adoption are not wholly unfounded, campaigners 
have failed to provide viable solutions or alternatives to adoption. Campaigners 
particularly demonise social workers on the grounds that they provide the Courts with 
prejudiced reports on parents. It is undeniable that social workers may sometimes be 
influenced by personal opinion. However, it is argued here that the law recognises this 
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flaw and works to restrict unfair assessment in the Courts. Furthermore, it is unfair to 
condemn social workers for mistakes made by the minority. For the most part, social 
workers are ‘praised for [their] adoption work’.148 Overall, adoption law certainly does 
not advocate the theft of children but rather, focuses on protecting children’s welfare. 
Child welfare is widely agreed, even by anti-adoption campaigners, to be of the utmost 
importance and the law should be commended in making welfare its ‘paramount 
consideration’.149 Prioritising children’s welfare means that intervention is necessary and 
that parents’ rights have to become secondary. However, the subordination of parental 
interests is a side-effect of the law, rather than its intention. Adoption law is likely to 
forever remain an area of controversy, but this can be regarded as a positive thing as 
critics provide the pressure needed to induce reform and further improve the law. 
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